Transitional Justice in South Korea:
One Country’s Restless Search for Truth and
Reconciliation
Paul Hanley*†
Abstract
A recent Korean film, “National Security”, about a democracy activist
and former Korean politician, Kim Geun-Tae, who was kidnapped and
tortured into making a false confession by police in 1985, has renewed
debate among South Koreans about the state of transitional justice in the
country. From 1995 to 2010, South Korea took a number of steps to
expose the political oppressions and human rights abuses of its past
authoritarian governments and to assist individuals involved in the
struggle for democracy to clear their names and restore their
reputations. This article analyzes the relative success and failure of South
Korea’s truth seeking process and the prospect for the realization of
transitional justice in the country in the future.
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Better to light one small candle than to curse the darkness.
-Chinese Proverb1
A recent Korean film, “National Security” (Namyoung-dong 1985
in Korean), is based on the memoir by Kim Geun-Tae, a democracy
activist and former Korean politician, who was kidnapped and tortured
into making a false confession by police in 1985 during the Chun DooHwan regime.2 The release of this film renewed debate among South
Koreans about the state of transitional justice in the country. Despite
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† All English translations of Korean-language materials referenced in this article
are by the author unless otherwise noted.
1

Author unknown.
Kim Do-Hyung, Torture Expert Lee Geun-An: “It Was a Kind of Art”, KOREAN
STORY (Dec. 13, 2011), http://koreanstory.wordpress.com/2011/12/13/tortureexpert-lee-geun-an-that-was-a-kind-of-art/ (describing the real-life “faceless
torture expert” who tortured Kim Lee Geun-An, who asserted that he was not a
torture expert but “an interrogation expert.”).
2
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claims by those opposed to investigating past crimes such as current
President Park Geun-Hye (the daughter of former South Korean dictator
Park Chun-Hee), who has referred to South Korea’s truth seeking process
as a “worthless scam”, 3 this article will show that many unresolved cases
remain.

I. INTRODUCTION
Torture, forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings and mass
executions occurred with disturbing regularity in Korea from the end of
World War II until the election of Kim Young-Sam in 1993. 4 Some
estimate that as many as 100,000 people were executed by governmental
authorities.5 Further, many South Koreans have been fighting to clear their
names of political subversion charges from the military regimes of the
1960s and 1980s.6 With the election of President Park, South Korea has,
in all likelihood, closed the book on its attempts at transitional justice.
From 1995 to 2010, however, South Korea took a number of steps to
expose the political oppressions and human rights abuses of its past
authoritarian governments and to assist individuals involved in the
struggle for democracy in order to clear their names and restore their
reputations. In 2010, when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was
shut down, Commission President Lee Young-Jo stated: “Even if we

3

See Son Byung-Kwan, Addressed and Concluded by Law? Park Geun-Hye
Should Apologise, OHMYNEWS NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 23, 2007) (translated from
Korean by Jeong-Min Lee),
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000387
883 (noting that on August 29, 2004 at a dinner party, Park Geun-Hye was
requested to comment on her father’s rule of South Korea, she stated that these
issues have “already been addressed and concluded by law. If these issues were to
be readdressed, it should be done after thorough legal examination, and shouldn’t
condemn politicians”).
4
See Choe Sang-Hun, In Seoul’s Red Scare, Redemption is Elusive For Accused
Spies, An Agonizing Wait For Justice in a Still Divided Country, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 10, 2007 (describing the agony suffered by the Venerable
Bong-Wang, a Buddhist monk who was tortured with electric shocks until he
signed a confession that he was a communist spy and how in 1998, after 15 years
in prison, he was released only to find his family had deserted him out of fear of
being associated with a confessed communist).
5
Ashley Rowland and Hwang Hae-Rym, Time Running Out on South Korea’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, STARS AND STRIPES (Jan. 19, 2010),
available at http://www.stripes.com/news/time-running-out-on-south-korea-struth-and-reconciliation-commission-1.98156.
6
Choe, supra note 4.
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investigated more, there's not much more to be revealed.” 7 This article
analyzes the veracity of Mr. Lee’s statements within the context of the
various attempts that South Korea has made in dealing with the human
rights abuses of the regimes that ruled Korea since the end of the Korean
War.
Part I of this paper provides a brief overview of modern history of
Korea, including a description of the authoritative regimes that controlled
South Korea from 1960 until 1993. Part II describes the various attempts
by South Korea to address crimes committed by its former authoritative
regimes and to restore the honor of those accused of crimes under those
regime. Part III will discuss the degree to which South Korea’s attempts at
transitional justice have been realized.8 This paper concludes with analysis
of the relative success and failure of South Korea’s truth seeking process
and the prospect for the realization of transitional justice in the country in
the future.

II. OVERVIEW OF MODERN KOREAN HISTORY
Korea’s modern history begins with Japan’s defeat in World War
II. In 1945, the United Nations divided Korea at the 38th Parallel in
accordance with an agreement wherein the Soviet Union would administer
the north and the United States the south. 9 When the Soviets and the
United States could not agree on the implementation of joint trusteeship

7

Charles J. Hanley and Hyung-Jin Kim, South Korea Shuts Down Korean-war
Human Rights Probe, Largely Absolves U.S., ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jul. 11, 2010,
http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/07/south_korea_shuts_down_kor
ean-.html.
8
See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/ (The International Center for Transitional Justice
provides that transitional justice “refers to a range of approaches that societies
undertake to reckon with legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse
as they move from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace,
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective rights”).
Other commentators have stated that key elements of transitional justice are truth
telling and accountability. See, e.g., Geoff Gentilucci, Truth-Telling and
Accountability in Democratizing Nations: The Cases Against Chile’s Augusta
Pinochet and South Korea’s Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, 5 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 80 (2005), available at http://cpilj.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/5-connpub-int-l-j-79.pdf.
9
See Bruce Cumings, KOREA: A PLACE IN THE SUN (W.W. Norton, 2th ed. 2005);
see also KOREAN HISTORY PROJECT,
http://www.koreanhistoryproject.org/Jta/Kr/KrGOV0.htm.
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for the entire country, separate governments were established in 1948,
with each claiming to be the legitimate government of all Korea.10
A. First Republic (1953 – 1960)
On August 15, 1948 the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was
formally established and with the backing of the United States, Syng-Man
Rhee was elected as the Republic’s first president.11 Rhee immediately
began instituting a variety of reforms, including land reform, wherein the
government confiscated and redistributed all land formerly held by the
Japanese colonial government, Japanese companies, and individual
Japanese colonists. 12 The Rhee government also followed a policy of
brutal repression of leftist activity and instituted harsh reprisals against
any and all threats by groups with perceived leftist leanings such as labor
unions and university student groups. 13 Because the United States saw
Rhee as ballast against the communist north, South Korea was the
beneficiary of vast sums of American aid. In fact, in some years
American aid to the south totaled the entire size of South Korea’s national
budget.14
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Led
by the United States, a 16-member coalition undertook the first collective
military action under the United Nations Command. Constantly changing
battle lines inflicted high civilian casualties and wrought near total
destruction on the entire peninsula. With China’s entry on behalf of North
Korea in 1951, fighting came to a stalemate close to the original line of
demarcation. Armistice negotiations, initiated in July 1951, finally

10

Id.
Lee Ki-Baik, A NEW HISTORY OF KOREA (1990).
12
Id.
13
See id. (Government perception that labor unions and university student groups
were sympathetic to North Korea and thus a threat to the rulers in the south
continued through the 1980s); see also James F. Person, New East German and
Soviet Evidence on North Korean Support to South Korean Political Parties and
Labor Unions, WILSON CENTER, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/neweast-german-and-soviet-evidence-north-korean-support-to-south-korean-political
(discussing newly translated German and Russian documents from 1960 which
indicate that North Korea provided political and material support to South Korean
political parties, labor unions, and student groups) (last visited May 7, 2014).
14
Cumings, supra note 9, 255, 306.
11
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concluded on July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom, now in the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ).15
Throughout his rule, Rhee went to great lengths to ensure that he
would stay in power. Rhee pushed through constitutional amendments that
made the presidency a directly elected position and promulgated an
amendment, which exempted him from the constitutionally mandated
eight-year term limit.16 However, in 1960, violent repressions of student
demonstrations on the day of the presidential election touched off massive
protesting and Rhee resigned amid widespread social strife.17
B. Second Republic (1960 - 1961)
After the student revolution, power was briefly held by an interim
administration until a new parliamentary election was held on July 29,
1960.18 The Democratic Party, which had been in opposition during the
First Republic, gained power and established the Second Republic, which
adopted a parliamentary system where the President took only a nominal
role.19
During the Second Republic there was a proliferation of political
activity, which had been repressed under the Rhee regime.20 Much of this
activity was from leftist and student groups, which had been instrumental

15

One sticking point to peace was the size of the flags at the negotiating table.
Giving new meaning to the phrase “Napoleon complex”, each day when the
opposing sides met, their accompanying flags were larger than the previous day.
This gamesmanship continued until the flagpoles would no longer fit in the
barracks where the negotiations were taking place. The issue was finally settled
when both sides agreed to place their respective flagpoles outside the barracks.
(An American soldier told me this anecdote during a visit to the DMZ in 1997).
See also Brandon K. Gaulthier, What was It Like to Negotiate with North Koreans
6o Years Ago, THE ATLANTIC (JULY 26, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/what-it-was-like-tonegotiate-with-north-koreans-60-years-ago/278130/ (discussing other North
Korean tactics such as shortening the legs of his chairs to make its generals seem
taller and noting that when a United Nations flag was on the conference table, a
bigger North Korean flag appeared alongside it after a break in the negotiations).
16
Lee Wa-Rang, Who Was Rhee Sygnman?, KIMSOFT (Feb. 22, 2000),
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/186.html.
17
Id.
18
See Yang Sung-Chul, THE NORTH & SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 193
(2001).
19
Id.
20
Id.
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in the overthrow of the First Republic.21 Union membership and political
activity grew rapidly during the later months of 1960.22
Under pressure from the left, the government carried out a series
of purges of military and police officials who had been involved in antidemocratic activities or corruption.23 The government passed a Special
Law to this effect on October 31, 1960, wherein 40,000 people were
placed under investigation. Of those investigated, more than 2,200
government officials and 4,000 police officers were purged for their
activities under the Rhee government.24
C. Military Rule (1961 – 1962)
The Second Republic ended on May 16, 1961, when Major
General Park Chung-Hee staged a coup d'état.25 Under pressure from the
Kennedy administration, Park promised a return to civilian rule. 26 On
December 2, 1962, the country held a referendum on returning to a
presidential system of rule, which purportedly passed with a 78.8%
majority. 27 Despite Park’s pledge not to run for office in the next
elections, Park ran anyway, narrowly winning the presidency in 1963.28
D. Third Republic (1963 – 1972)
Park ran for president again in 1967, winning the presidency in a
closely contested race.29 At the time, the presidency was constitutionally

21

Id.
See Yang, supra note 18, at 193—94 (approximating 2,000 demonstrations held
during the eight months of the Second Republic).
23
Id.
24
See Andrew C. Nahm, KOREA: TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION 411 (Hollym
International Corp., 2d ed. 1985) (There was also great economic unrest at the
time. For example, Korea’s currency lost half of its value against the dollar
between fall 1960 and spring 1961).
25
Seung-Mi Han, The New Community Movement: Park Chung-Hee and the
Making of State Populism in Korea, 77 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 69, 73 (2004).
26
See Apoorv Agarwal, Park Chung Hee: Another Dictator or a Saviour, SIMPLY
DECODED (March 20, 2013), http://www.simplydecoded.com/2013/03/20/parkchung-hee/ (discussing Park’s rise to power and 18-year dictatorial rule of South
Korea).
27
See ANDREA M. SAVADA & WILLIAM SHAW, SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY
STUDY (Library of Congress, 4th ed. 1992)
28
Id.
29
Id.
22
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limited to two terms. Park, however, forced a constitutional amendment
through the National Assembly in 1969, which allowed him to seek a third
term.30 He was re-elected in the 1971 presidential election.31
During the Third Republic, South Korea maintained close ties
with and continued to receive a substantial amount of aid from the United
States. A status of forces agreement adopted in 1965, clarified the legal
situation of the U.S. forces stationed in the country. 32 Soon thereafter,
South Korea joined the Vietnam War, eventually sending a total of
300,000 soldiers to fight alongside U.S. and South Vietnamese troops.33
The South Korean economy grew rapidly during this period. The
Park regime used the influx of foreign aid to provide negative interest
loans to export businesses.34 However, as the economy grew so did Park’s
power. Park declared martial law on October 17, 1972, dissolving the

30

Nahm, supra note 24, at 423.
The leading opposition candidate at the time was Kim Dae-Jung, a political
dissident and who was elected President of South Korea in 1997. The government
made two attempts on Kim’s life. The first was a car accident allegedly staged by
the KCIA, which left Kim with a permanent limp. The other incident occurred
when the KCIA reportedly kidnapped Kim from a hotel in Japan and trundled him
onto a fishing boat. Kim was later quoted as saying that a weight had been
attached to his feet aboard the boat heading toward Korea, indicating that the
kidnappers had intended to drown him by throwing him into the sea. They were,
however, forced to abandon this plan, as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
began a pursuit of the kidnappers’ boat. Subsequently, Kim was released in the
port city of Pusan. According to some reports the U.S. Ambassador at the time
intervened with the South Korean government to save Kim's life. See Carol Clark,
Kim Dae-Jung: From Prison to President, CNN, available at
http://archive.today/UYC6K; see also Kim Dae-Jung Biography, THE FAMOUS
PEOPLE, http://www.thefamouspeople.com/profiles/kim-dae-jung-52.php
32
There are approximately 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. See
Thomas Shanker, Gates Urges More Japanese Action on Global Security, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/world/asia/09gates.html?ref=asia.
33
See Don Kirk, Confronting Korea’s Agony in Vietnam, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE (Sep. 28, 2002),
http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/09/28/blue_ed3_.php.
34
Although Park was without question a brutal dictator, he remains very popular
because most South Koreans give Park credit for its miraculous economic
development. See Donald Gregg, Park Chung Hee, TIME (Aug. 23 1999),
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/park1.html.
31
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National Assembly and announcing plans to eliminate the popular election
of the president.35
E. Fourth Republic (1972 – 1979)
The Fourth Republic began with the adoption of the Yushin
Constitution on November 21, 1972.36 The Yushin Constitution gave Park
effective control over the parliament. In the face of continuing popular
unrest, Park promulgated a series of emergency decrees in 1974 and 1975,
which banned people from engaging in actions that challenged the Yushin
Constitution and led to the prosecution and imprisonment of hundreds of
dissidents.37
Judges enforced the special decrees for President Park to
perpetuate his rule and control the population.38 Under the law, citizens
were punished just for criticizing the government while talking with
friends in pubs, classrooms or on the streets. 39 Recently, one of these
former judges, surnamed Lee, expressed his feelings about his special
decree rulings: “I always feel regret about the rulings I made under the
Emergency Measures Act. But they were in inevitable. My heart aches
when I think about the past, and I think we, including the government, are
fully responsible for it.” 40
F. Fifth Republic (1979 - 1987)

35

See Donald Gregg, Park Chung Hee, TIME (Aug. 23 1999),
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/park1.html.
36
The Yushin Constitution remained in effect until Park’s death at which time the
country reverted to its “original” constitution, originally adopted on July 17, 1948.
This constitution has been amended nine times and is in effect today. See
DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION], available at
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/download/Constitution_
of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf (S. Kor.).
37
There are many cases of individuals prosecuted under Park’s emergency
decrees, many times for simply making an off-handed statement critical of Park.
For example, a construction worker was sentenced to eight months in prison for
drunkenly stating that Park “wants to be president forever.” Drunks Criticizing
President Punished Under Park's Rule, KOREA TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 3005044.
38
Annie I. Bang, Park Decrees Undermined Justice, KOREA HERALD (Apr. 5,
2010), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20070131000088.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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The head of the KCIA assassinated Park in 1979 while the two
were having dinner. 41 Park’s assassination led to a popular uprising,
composed primarily of university students and labor unions. The protests
reached a climax after Park’s second in command, General Chun DooHwan, seized power and declared martial law. 42 On May 18, 1980, a
confrontation broke out in the city of Kwangju between students of
Chonnam National University (protesting against the closure of their
university) and the police.43 The confrontation turned into a citywide riot
that lasted nine days.44 The government quelled the riot by sending in the
army, including special-forces units that reportedly hunted down and
executed the leaders of the protest, as well as innocent civilians. 45
Estimates of the death toll, as a result of what is now referred to as the
Kwangju Massacre, range as high as 2,000. 46 Public outrage over the
killings consolidated nationwide support for democracy, paving the road
for the first democratic elections in 1987.47
G. Sixth Republic (1987 - 1992)
In 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, one of Chun’s military colleagues in the
1979 coup was elected to the president by the popular vote. In 1993, Kim
Young-Sam was elected as South Korea’s first civilian president in 30

There were two previous attempts on Park’s life. On January 28, 1968, a 31man detachment from North Korea crossed the DMZ with the purpose of killing
Park. They made it within 800 meters of the Blue House (Korea’s version of the
White House) dressed in ROK uniforms before they were discovered. In the
ensuing firefight that occurred over the course of several days, 68 South Koreans
and three Americans died. The second assassination attempt, launched again by
North Korea, occurred when Park was delivering a speech during a ceremony
celebrating South Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule. A North Korean agent
fired shots from the front row of the audience. The bullets missed Park who had
finished his speech but struck his wife, who died later from her wounds. See
Donald Gregg, Park Chung Hee, TIME (Aug. 23, 1999),
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/park1.html.
42
See Sheryl WuDunn, Korea Indicts Two Former Presidents in Staging 1979
Coup, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 22, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/22/world/south-korea-indicts-2-formerpresidents-in-staging-of-1979-coup.html.
43
See Flashback: The Kwangju Massacre, BRIT. BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(May 17, 2000), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/752055.stm
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
41
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years. South Korea’s commitment to democratize its political processes
reached the end of a long bloody road in 1997 with the election of Kim
Dae-Jung. Kim’s election represented the first peaceful transfer of
government between parties in South Korea.

III. THE ROLE OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH
KOREA
For more than a decade, South Korea has taken a number of steps
towards rectifying wrongs perpetrated by the authoritarian military
regimes, which ruled the country since 1961.48 The following is a brief
description of each piece of legislation and the legal and/or political
challenges each faced.
A. Special Act Regarding May 18 Democratization Movement
(1995)
In the early 1990’s there was a great deal of public demand for
justice for the victims of the “democratization movement”. 49 Although
Kim Young-Sam strongly criticized the actions of former presidents Chun
and Roh, he believed prosecution of the two might lead to political and
social unrest.50 Kim argued against criminal prosecution of the former
presidents stating: “truth should be reserved for historical judgment in the
future.”51 From a legal perspective, there was concern that the prosecution
of previous military dictators may be barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. 52 As debate raged amongst politicians and the public, the
Seoul Prosecutor’s Office made the controversial decision to suspend the

48

Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping With Past Wrongs
After Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 579 (2007).
49
Id. at 581. (Under President Kim Young-Sam many dissidents were
“rehabilitated” insofar as they ascribed the status of “democratization movement
involvers” who took part in the “democratization movement”, as opposed to
communist sympathizers fomenting social unrest and engaged in criminality).
See, e.g., Gwangju Minjuhwa Undong Gwanryeonja Bosang Deungye Gwanhan
Beobyul [Act for Compensation for the Victims in the Democratization
Movement in Kwangju], Act No. 4266, Aug. 6, 1990 (S. Kor.).
50
Cho, supra note 48, at 581-82. (Kim entered the Blue House with the support of
many high-ranking military leaders and thus, was reluctant to resort to criminal
punishment for mutiny, insurrection and murder for the former military leaders).
51
Id. at 581.
52
Id. at 582.
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prosecution of the military leaders. 53 Although the Prosecutor’s Office
determined the 1979 coup involved crimes of mutiny, insurrection and
murder, and that the suppression of the 1980 Kwangju uprising constituted
treason and murder, it found that prosecution of these crimes were barred
by the statute of limitations.54
The Korean Constitutional Court addressed this issue in 1995
when, in a majority decision, it declared that a prospective prosecution of
the two formers dictators was constitutional insofar as it did not violate the
statute of limitations. 55 The Court held that under Article 84 of the
Constitution, statutes of limitations are stayed while a president is in office
except for crimes of insurrection and treason. 56 The Court determined,
however, that it would not intervene in prosecutorial decisions, noting the
conflict between “realizing justice” by punishing former military leaders
and the danger of fomenting social confrontation that such prosecutions
would create.57
When the government and the legal system refused to push forth
with prosecutions of Chun and Roh, South Korean citizens again took to
the streets in 1995. As a result, the National Assembly passed the Special
Act Concerning May 18 Democratization Movement (the “Act”).58 The
Act suspended the statute of limitations for “crimes against constitutional
order” that had been committed on or around December 12, 1979 and May
18, 1980, the dates relating to the coup and to the Kwangju massacre.59
The Act also provided for the right to re-trial for those deemed to have

53

Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
55
Id. The KCC was established in September 1988 and is modeled on the
European model, insofar as it is specialized court that determines constitutional
laws, disputes between governmental entities, Constitution Complaints filed by
individual, impeachments and dissolution of political parties. The justices are
appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly and serve
six-year renewable terms. Decisions rendered by the KCC are final and cannot be
appealed. See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, http://english.ccourt.go.kr.
56
DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 84 (S. Kor.)
(“[t]he President cannot be charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of
office except for insurrection or treason.”)
57
Cho, supra note 48, at 582.
58
Id. at 582—83. (The final straw was the revelation that both Chun and Roh had
amassed huge sums of money in bribes received during their respective
presidencies).
59
Minjuhwa Undong Deung E Gwanhan Teukbyeol Beop [Special Act
Concerning May 18 Democratization Movement], Act. No. 5029, Dec. 21, 1995
(S. Kor.).
54
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been punished because of their involvement in the democracy
movement.60 As a result, the Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office initiated
criminal proceedings for treason against Chun, Roh and other former
high-ranking officials.61
The defendants filed a motion with the KCC, challenging the
constitutionality of the Act asserting: (1) it violated equal protection
principles, as it was directed only to punish a specific group of
individuals; and (2) constituted retrospective punishment and thus,
violated ex post facto principles. 62 The Court, however, upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, determining that despite the fact that the Act
was created to prosecute a narrow set of individuals, it was not per se
unconstitutional.63 Relying heavily on public policy as the foundation of
its decision, the Court determined that the Act was founded upon a
national demand to rectify past wrongs and establish “legitimate”
constitutionalism in South Korea.64
On the ex post facto issue, the Court held that because the
Supreme Court at that time had not decided the issue of whether the
statute of limitations expired when the Act was passed, the court found
that it would not be unconstitutional to extend the statute of limitations. 65
Importantly, the justices failed to agree whether the statute of limitations
had already expired, with four justices holding the Act was constitutional

60

Id.
Cho, supra note 48, at 583.
62
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 96 HunKa 2, Feb. 16, 1996, (8-1 KCCR, 51)
(S. Kor.) (noting that ex post facto criminal punishment is prohibited by the
Korean Constitution under the Article 12 (1) (enshrining the principle of due
process) and Article 13 (1) (specifically prohibiting prosecutions acts that do not
constitute crimes under the law in force when the act is committed). For
background on the role of the Constitutional Court in South Korea, see
Jurisdiction, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA,
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/jurisdiction/faq.jsp (last visited Apr. 17,
2014) (the Korean Constitutional Court was established in September 1988 and is
based on the European model insofar as it is a specialized court that determines
constitutional laws, disputes between governmental entities, constitution
complaints filed by individuals, impeachments and dissolution of political parties.
The Court’s justices are appointed by the president with the approval of the
National Assembly and serve six-year renewable terms. Decisions rendered by
the KCC are final and cannot be appealed.).
63
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 96 HunKa 2, Feb. 16, 1996, (8-1 KCCR, 51)
(S. Kor.).
64
Id.
65
Id.
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and five finding in favor of unconstitutionality. 66 Under Korean law a
finding of unconstitutionality requires a vote of six or more justices and
therefore, the five-justice dissent did not meet the threshold for a
determination that the Act was unconstitutional.67
The Supreme Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions for
treason and killing for the purpose of treason, holding:
The defendants grasped political power after they stopped
the exercise of the authority constitutional state
institutions by mutiny and rebellion. Even if they had
arguably ruled the State based on the constitution, which
was revised by popular referendum, it should not be
overlooked that a new legal order was established by
mutiny and rebellion. It cannot be tolerated under any
circumstances under our constitutional order to stop the
exercise of the authority of constitutional state institutions
and grasp political power by violence, not following
democratic procedure.
Therefore, the mutiny and
rebellion can be punishable.68
The Supreme Court affirmed Chun’s conviction and sentence to life in
prison and Roh’s conviction and sentence of 17 years in prison, as well as
upholding the convictions and sentences of 23 of their subordinates.69 In
1997, all those convicted under the Act received presidential pardons and
were released from prison. 70 No other soldiers or government officials
were punished.
B. Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (2001)

66

Id.
Id.
68
Cho, supra note 48, at 584.
69
Id. The Supreme Court only examined issues related to the defendants’
convictions and sentences for treason and killing for the purpose of treason and
not constitutional issues, which were resolved by the KCC in its Decision of
February 16, 1996, 96 HunKa 2. See e.g., Constitutional Court, supra note 62.
70
See Andrew Pollack, Two Dictators Leave Korean Jails, Pardoned After Two
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/23/world/2ex-dictators-leave-korea-jails-pardoned-after-2-years.html?pagewanted=print
(reporting that at the time of the article Kim Dae-Jung agreed to the pardons as a
means “unify the country”).
67
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In 2001, the National Assembly established a commission to
investigate deaths of individuals who were involved in South Korea’s prodemocracy movement and who died under suspicious circumstances. The
Commission was, however, hampered by the fact that most of the deaths it
was investigating occurred many years ago, usually long after the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. As a result, most of the
individuals who tortured, murdered and gave false testimony to convict
innocent citizens remain unpunished due to the legal impediment of
statutes of limitations for these crimes.71 Again, civil and human rights
groups strongly argued in favor of legislation, which would allow for
prosecutions of those involved in past crimes by extending statutes of
limitations.72 However, two bills that would allow for circumvention of
various statues of limitations for those accused of perpetrating crimes
against those involved in the democracy movement failed to pass the
National Assembly.73
C. The Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement
and Providing Compensation for Them (2000)
In 2000, the government passed legislation (hereinafter the
“Democracy Act”) the purpose of which was to recognize the sacrifice,
and in some cases, provide compensation for those determined to have
been involved in South Korea’s “democracy movement”. 74 The
Democracy Act established the right of resistance against South Korea’s
illegitimate regimes. 75 The Democracy Act established a Review
Commission (the “Commission”) to review applications made by
individuals who asserted they were involved in the democracy movement

See Cho, supra note 48, at 585 (Under Korea’s Criminal Procedure Code,
crimes such as murder are subject to a 15 year statute of limitations).
72
See Andrew Pollack, 2 Ex-Dictators Leave Korea Jails, pardoned after 2 Years,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (DEC. 23, 1993),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9403E3D7153EF930A15751C1A
961958260&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/R/Roh%20Tae%20Woo.
73
Id.
74
This term is defined as “activities that contributed to establishing democratic
constitutional order and resurrecting and enhancing freedoms and rights of people
by resisting authoritative rule that had disturbed free democratic basic order and
violated people’s fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution…” Act fon
the Honor Restoration of and Compensation to Persons Related to
Democratization Movements, Statutes of South. Korea, Act. No. 6123, Jan. 12,
2000 (S. Kor.).
75
Id.
71
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and were persecuted as a result. 76 Although the Commission had no
investigative or judicial authority, it had the power to recommend pardons
or expungement of an applicant’s conviction.77 Importantly, it also had the
power to make recommendations to state or local governments and/or
private companies to rehire individuals involved in the democracy
movement. 78 Further, the Commission has made recommendations to
schools to abolish disciplinary records and bestow honorary degrees upon
those punished for their involvement in the democracy movement and
suffered some detriment as a result. In addition to this so-called “honor
restoration”, the Commission could recommend financial compensation to
qualified applicants.79
In its most high profile matter, the Commission reviewed the case
of eight college students who, under extreme torture by the KCIA,
admitted to being North Korean spies. They were convicted and executed
one day after the Supreme Court confirmed their convictions and death
sentences.80 On December 27, 2005, after a recommendation from the
Commission, the Seoul Central District Court re-examined the case and
overturned the convictions.81
The Commission also examined a number of cases involving a
concentration camp called the Samchung Re-education Camp, set up by
the military. Take, for example, the case of Jean Jeong-Bae. The
Commission found that Mr. Jean was shot on June 20, 1981 by a
Samchung guard for protesting his arrest, detention and demand for a

76

Cho, supra note 48, at 590—92 (describing the Democracy Act and the Review
Commission that examines applications by those claiming to be “democratization
movement involvers”).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. According to Cho, as of December 28, 2006, “democratization movement
involvers” were given $28,700,000 on compensation. Id. at 592 (citing Dong
Jung-Min, Recognizing 46 Illegal Labor Activists as Democratic Activists, DONGA ILBO, Dec. 18, 2006).
80
Id. at 592; see also Ju Jin-Woo, The People’s Revolutionary Party, Homicide
Committed in the Name of the Law, JU JIN-WOO’S KOREAN MODERN HISTORY
PODCAST (SEP. 12, 2012),
http://blog.naver.com/srchcu?Redirect=Log&logNo=30142229623, (describing
how one defendant, Ha Jae-Wan, was caught recording North Korean radio and
sharing with others, a crime under South Korean law and how the government at
the time was under a lot of stress due to protests of students against Park ChungHee).
81
Choe Young-Yoon, Sentence of Innocence to the People’s Revolution Party
Case After 32 Years, HANKOOK ILBO (JAN. 24, 2007).
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formal trial.82 Another case involved a claim by a former inmate of the
Samchung Camp occurred in 2001, when a man, surnamed Lee, submitted
a petition to the Commission, calling for compensation for pain and
suffering as a result of his incarceration at the Camp.83 The commission
rejected his claim finding Mr. Lee was not a pro-democracy activist and
was, therefore, not eligible for compensation from the government.84 Mr.
Lee then brought his case to an administrative court, and in 2013 that
court recognized Mr. Lee’s claim and ordered the government to
compensate him. The Court stated that the 74-year-old Lee: “fought for
democracy in the face of repression by the authorities . . . was injured due
to his campaigning for freedom and basic rights … [and] should be
regarded as a democracy fighter.” 85 It was the first time that a court
recognized a surviving victim of the camp as a democracy fighter.86
Another Commission case that garnered a lot of attention
concerned the mysterious death of Tsche Chong-Kil, a law professor at
Seoul National University, whose body was found at the bottom of a fire
escape outside the KCIA building.87 The KCIA announced that Professor
Tsche had committed suicide by throwing himself out of the building after

82

Cho, supra note 48, at 600; Lee Ju-Young, Presidential Truth Commission on
Suspicious Deaths: Obligation and Compensation Regarding Samchung Reeducation Camp, OHMYNEWS NEWS AGENCY (OCT. 1, 2002),
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000089
478; see also National Human Rights Commission of Korea Recommended Equal
Compensations for Foreign Victims of Samchung Re-education Camp, ASIAN
PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION CENTER (SEP. 5, 2006),
http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/newsinbrief-en/section1/2006/09/nationalhuman-rights-commission-of-korea-recommended-equal-compensations-forforeign-victims-of-sam.html (The Camp was set up under President Chun DooHwan. Detained individuals were subjected to organized violence under the name
of “social cleansing,” which aimed at the elimination of social vices, such as
violence, smuggling and drug use. Some 42,000 individuals were arrested without
proper warrants and subjected "purification education" through violence and hard
labor).
83
Kang Hyun-Kyung, Samcheong Camp Victim to Receive Compensation,
KOREA TIMES (JULY 2, 2013),
http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/view.jsp?req_newsidx=138513.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Choi Yu-Sik, Former Agent Says KCIA Murdered Professor, THE CHOSUNILBO
(Dec. 10, 2001),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2001/12/10/2001121061341.html.
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confessing that he was a North Korean spy.88 The Commission found that
the KCIA had tortured Professor Tsche and that there was a “high
probability” that he was killed and his body thrown out a window of the
KCIA building. 89 The Commission based its decision, in part, on the
testimony of a former KCIA agent who stated: “[t]he official
announcement that Professor Tsche had confessed to being a spy and
jumped to his death was a fabrication … when he lost consciousness while
being tortured, investigators mistook him for dead and pushed him off the
fire exit” in order to cover up the death.90 In February 2006, the Seoul
High Court awarded Professor Tsche’s family1.8 billion KRW
(approximately $1.9 million) in compensation.91
The Commission was dissolved in 2004, with a number of
unresolved cases before it. The most high profile cases were those of
Chang Joon-Ha, a leading activist against the Park regime found dead on a
mountain in 1974 and Lee Chul-Kyu and Lee Rae-Chang, both activists,
whose bodies were found in isolated places (a reservoir and beach
respectively). 92 Prior to its dissolution, the Commission recommended
that the National Assembly establish a new commission with greater
investigative powers, including the authority to punish those who refuse to
give evidence or commit perjury before it. 93 The Commission also
recommended passage of a law barring the application of the statutes of
limitations for state crimes against human rights.94
i.

Whether Individuals Involved in Counter-Violence
Should Be Acknowledged as Democracy Movement
Involvers

As South Korea struggled to come to terms with its past, an
important issue arose with regard to whether individuals who engaged in
violent opposition to past authoritative regimes should be eligible for
relief under the Democracy Act. One case involved a group of Dong-Eui
University students who staged a sit-in to protest what they considered to

88

See id.; see also History of Harm, TIME (June 9, 2003),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,457405,00.html (detailing
incidences of violence within South Korea).
89
Id.
90
The Final Truth About Tsche Chong-Kil, THE HANKYOREH (Mar. 19, 2004),
http://www.hani.co.kr/section001100000/2004/03/001100000200403190204001.html.
91
Cho, supra note 48, at 601.
92
Id. at 602.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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be corrupt university entrance exam procedures.95 When the police broke
into the library to break-up the demonstration some students threw
Molotov cocktails at the police.96 In the ensuing fire, seven police officers
were burned alive and the students were convicted of the crime of murder
by arson.97
In 2002, the Commission determined that the forty-six students
involved in the demonstration were, in fact, part of the democracy
movement and should thus be absolved of their criminal liability for the
deaths of the police officers.98 The family members of the dead officers
filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court arguing that the decision of
the Commission violated their constitutional rights and tarnished the
reputations of the dead.99 The Court held that the family members lacked
standing and that the Committee’s decision did not cast the officers in a
negative light. 100 The police, conservative politicians and certain
members of the media, criticized this decision asserting that the de-facto
result of the decision was to transform cop killers into activists.101 The
final decision of the Commission was a compromise by the court; the
students were determined to be “democratization movement involvers”
and the dead policemen, “officers of merit”.102
D. The Basic Act for Coping with Past History for Truth and
Reconciliation (2005)
Based on the outgoing Commission’s statements concerning the
need for a new truth finding body and the overwhelming support of the
public, the National Assembly enacted The Basic Act for Coping with
Past History for Truth and Reconciliation in 2005.103 The Act established
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Id. at 593—94; see also Stephen R. Weisman, Korea Addresses Abuses of Its
Past, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 1989), available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE5D91E3FF937A15756C0
A96F948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (describing the violent escalation of
the demonstrations by Dong-Eui University students as atypical for the time).
96
Cho, supra note 48, at 593—94.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Cho, supra note 48, at 594 (citing Decision of October 27, 2005, 2002 HunMa
425 (Korean Constitutional Court).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Commission/outline.asp (last visited Apr. 6,
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) as an independent
organization that was given a four-year mandate to initiate investigations
on suspicious deaths by petition or by its own volition.104 The TRC was
made up of 15 members, eight recommended by the National Assembly,
four appointed by the President and three nominated by the Supreme
Court.105 The TRC had an expansive mandate. In addition to abuses under
past regimes, the TRC was also empowered to investigate crimes
committed during the Japanese occupation106 and the Korean War.107 The
first President of the TRC, Father Song Gi-Im, described the purpose and
mandate of the TRC was: “to investigate and find out the truth and take
necessary measures to bring about reconciliation in case relating to the
anti-Japanese independence movement, mass victimization of civilians
before and during the Korean war, human rights violations and politically
fabricated trials during authoritarian rule, and the like.”108
Importantly, the TRC had the power to request relevant
individuals to submit affidavits, appear for inquiry and submit evidence
pertinent to its particular investigation. 109 Unlike the Commission on
Suspicious Deaths, the TRC had limited subpoena power to compel the

2014) (outlining the mandate, organization and operation of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See Cho, supra note 48, at 608. There has been strong pressure by Korean
academics and the public at large for the investigation and subsequent publishing
of an “encyclopedia” of the names of “pro-Japanese collaborators.” However,
investigating and publishing the names of those involved in pro-Japanese
activities is inherently problematic given that Japanese collaborators have likely
long since passed away and the Korean Constitution provides that “[n]o citizen
shall suffer unfavorable treatment on account of an act not of his own doing but
committed by a relative.” DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 13(3) (S. Kor.). As it is almost certain that relatives of those
on the list would suffer at the very least significant social stigmatization, there is a
serious question whether publishing such a list would pass constitutional muster.
107
See Chang Jae-Soon, Evidence Provokes Investigation of U.S. Navy Attack On
Refugees Korean War, available on Westlaw at 4/14/07 PILOT-STAR 14 (Apr.
14, 2007) (reporting on the discovery by the Associated Press in May 2007 of a
declassified 1950 document from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea informing
Washington that the U.S. military had adopted a policy of shooting approaching
refugees as a means of guarding against North Korean infiltrators and describing
a September 1, 1950 incident where the U.S. Navy allegedly fired on a group of
refugees encamped on a beach in Pohang).
108
Id.
109
Cho, supra note 48, at 608.
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appearance of individuals who refuse to appear more than three times
without just cause. 110 In addition, it had the power to impose
administrative fines on those who made false statements, submitted false
information, refused or evaded the TRC’s investigation or subpoena. 111
Part of the mandate of the TRC was to recommend reconciliation between
offenders and victims or their families based on an offenders’ repentance
and the victims’ or families’ forgiveness.112
One of the most controversial decisions made by the TRC was its
determination to publish the names of 492 justices who had rendered
decisions in as many as 1,412 cases involving violations of emergency
decrees under the Park regime. 113 The Korean Bar Association sharply
criticized the Commission for its decision stating that identifying the
justices would serve only to aggravate public distrust of the judiciary. 114
Others argued that it was unfair to place all responsibility on the judges
because they had no choice but to enforce the Park’s emergency decrees,
as at that time, it was the law.115 Further, critics asserted that police and
prosecutors, who arrested, indicted and forced violators of Park’s
emergency decrees to stand trial, remained unnamed and unpunished.116
Supporters of the Commission’s decision to publish the names have called
for the removal of those justices who remain on the bench but to date, no

110

Id.
Id. at 609.
112
Id.
113
See Annie I. Bang, Truth Panel Faces Angry Backlash (January 31, 2007),
available on Westlaw at 1/31/07 WRLDNWSC; see also Jean Yae-Hyun, How
Should the Judiciary Deal with the Issue of Transitional Justice, NAE-IL
NEWSPAPER (Feb. 5, 2007), available at
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=086
&aid=0000054616 (reporting on the TRC’s disclosure of the names of Judges
who issued “emergency decree” verdicts during the Park Chun-Hee regime).
114
See id.; see also Kim Rahn, Past Wrongdoing Probe Embarrasses Park,
KOREA TIMES (Jan. 31, 2007), available at Westlaw at 1/31/07 KORTIMES
(discussing the assertion of Park Geun-Hye, daughter of the late dictator Park
Chun-He and chairwoman of the Grand National Party, that the sole purpose of
disclosing of the names of judges, was to embarrass her and her party in the leadup to the 2007 election).
115
See Unwarranted Revelation Legacy of Dictatorship Dumped on Judges,
YONHAP ENGLISH NEWS (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN2007020200
0800315 (republished editorial from the Korea Times dated February 2, 2007).
116
Id.
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such action has been taken.117 To the contrary, subsequent to being named
by the TRC, most of the judges continued with their careers as judges,
lawyers and academics, with some even serving on the Korean
Constitutional Court and the Korean Supreme Court.118 It should be
noted, however, that not all judges toed the party line; some judges
followed their conscience and refused to enforce what they considered to
be unjust decrees.119 One case is that of Lee Young-Gu who, in 1976, was
the chief judge of Seoul Yeongdeungpo-gu district court and handed down
a not guilty verdict to a teacher who was accused of criticizing the
government in violation of both the Anti-Communist Law and the
Emergency Decree No. 9. Another man, Yang Young-Tae, who was a
High Court judge of Gwang-ju in 1975, dismissed a guilty verdict against
a farmer who had received 3 years imprisonment and 5 years probation
during his trial for criticizing president Park Jung-Hee. 120 Both judges
were punished for their decisions. 121 Within a month, Judge Lee was
demoted and voluntarily left the judiciary.122 Judge Yang, remained as a
low level judge while his compliant colleagues on the bench advanced to

117

Why Single Out the Judges, THE CHOSUN ILBO (Jan. 31, 2007, 9:09 AM),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/01/31/2007013161011.html;
see also We Wholeheartedly Support the Release of the Names of Former
‘Emergency Decree’ Justices!, THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES’ UNION
(Feb. 1, 2007), available at http://www.gwanakv.or.kr/bbs/board/ttboard.cgi?act=read&db=news_pds&idx=285 (trans. JeongMin Lee).
118
For example, Lee Kang-Kuk was named by the TRC and served as the head of
the Korean Constitutional Court from 2007 to 2013. Biography of Lee Kang-Kuk,
NAVER,
http://people.search.naver.com/search.naver?where=nexearch&query=%EC%9D
%B4%EA%B0%95%EA%B5%AD&sm=tab_txc&ie=utf8&key=PeopleService&
os=112327 (trans. Jeong-Min Lee); see also Seong Hye-Mi, Over Ten Current
High-ranking Judges Including the Head of Constitutional Court and Supreme
Court Justices, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 31, 2007, 10:34 PM), available at
http://bemil.chosun.com/nbrd/bbs/view.html?b_bbs_id=10038&num=13831
(reporting on the naming of judges by the TRC) (trans. Jeong-Min Lee).
119
Jean Jong-Hui and Lee Chun-Jae, The Judges Who took off Their Robes for
Making the Right Decision During the Emergency Decree, HAN GYO RAE
NEWSPAPER (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/187596.html (trans. Jeong-Min
Lee).
120
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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high judicial positions.123 These brave men stand out as exceptions to the
492 justices who had enforced the emergency decrees who defended
themselves with self-serving claims that they were only applying the
positive law of the time and the all too familiar defense heard at
Nuremburg that they were only following orders.124

IV. DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2005 TO THE PRESENT
The TRC was dissolved in June 2010 amidst a sea of criticism
from both its opponents and advocates.125 The TRC heard a total of 11,175
petitions reaching final conclusion in 8,450 cases (85.6%), leaving 510
cases (4.7%) unsolved and declined to hear 1,729 cases (15.5%).126
The most publicized reports issued by the Commission focused on
mass executions by South Korean authorities before and during the 1950 –
1953 Korean War and on the killing of innocent civilians by US forces.127
Research also focused on the suppression of leftist civilians and soldiers in
that era and of suspected communists after North Korean forces invaded
the south in June 1950.128 The commission also investigated killings by
US forces, who fired on refugees streaming south following the North
Korean invasion.129 Conservative opponents of the truth seeking process
have criticized the reports documenting these killings, as “leftist.”130
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Id. (Judge Yang was finally promoted to a judicial scholar of the Supreme
Court).
124
Id.
125
Don Kirk, South Korea’s TRC to Fold, RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE
(Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/article/south-korea%E2%80%99s-trc-fold See also Ryu In-Ha, The Truth
and Reconciliation Committee Ends as the Truth of the Victims Remain
Undisclosed, THE KYUNGHYANG NEWSPAPER (Dec. 27, 2010), available at
125
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201012272137245
&code=940100 (describing the reaction of the National Association of the
Bereaved Families of the Korean War Victims to the TRC report who asserted
that the TRC had produced its report in secret but also at the last moment).
126
See Ryu In-Ha, The Park Geun-Hye Government Should Not Neglect the
Outcry of Civilian Victims!, TONGILNEWS (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=105032 (trans. JeongMin Lee).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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After assuming office in February 2008, conservative President
Lee Myung-Bak replaced the liberal head of the TRC appointed by Roh
Moo-Hyun with the conservative, Lee Young-Jo, as head of the
commission. 131 The TRC soon found itself fighting budget cuts and
restrictions on its investigative powers, which some believed was due to
the fact that President Lee Myung-bak and his ruling conservative party
were uncomfortable with the scrutiny of the country’s past.132 Advocates
further asserted that the Lee government had reluctantly inherited the TRC
and would like to see it shut down.133 The commission’s new president
stated that, having spent 20 billion KRW ($17.79 million), the TRC had
not been cost effective and that it should cease its work without
extension.134 The TRC was shut down in June 2010. The term period of
the TRC was until April 2010 and although it could have been extended
for an additional two years, until April 2012, it was only extended for an
additional two months.135
When Park Geun Hye ascended to the presidency in 2013, she
discussed forming a commission to deal with reconciliation issues,
especially those that took place during her father’s presidency but no
action has been taken to date.136 The progressive former head of the TRC
doubts that Park would enact such a plan, asserting that Park’s true
purpose is the exoneration of her father’s name.137

See Do Khiem and Kim Kung-Soo, Crimes, Concealment and South Korea’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, THE ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL: JAPAN FOCUS
(Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kim-Sung_soo/2848.
132
See Ashley Rowland and Hwang Hye-Rym, Time running out on South
Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, STARS AND STRIPES (Jan. 19,
2010), available at
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Ryu In-Ha, The TRC Ends Without Unveiling the Truth About Civilian Victims,
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THE KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (Dec. 27, 2010),
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http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201012272137245
&code=940100.
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Id.
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See Andrew Wolman, Looking Back While Moving Forward: the Evolution of
Truth Commissions in Korea, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 27, 53-54 (2013),
available at
http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2013/05/APLPJ_14.3_Wolman_FINAL.pdf.
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Many South Koreans are, however, demanding that further action
be taken regarding past crimes.138 One example is that of politician Lee
Jae-Ho, a member of the Saenuri party, recently announced that he has put
forth the “basic law for coping with past history for truth and
reconciliation”, which is to reactivate the Truth and Reconciliation
Committee. 139 The proposed law would allow the Commission to work on
their investigation for a maximum of five more years, three years for an
initial investigation, with a possible two-year extension.140 Mr. Lee stated
the reason for his proposal was: “because of [the TRC’s] time limit for
petitions, many victims did not receive an official accounting of the truth
nor recover their tarnished reputations and even subsequent remedies were
unsatisfying.”141 Thus, a troubled cloud hangs over the state of transitional
justice in South Korea to this day.

V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the claims by opponents of Korea’s truth seeking
process, South Korea continues its struggle to free itself from the jackboot
of its past. This is due in large part to the fact that Korean truth
commissions can, with a few exceptions, also be characterized as
essentially victim-centered. They have rarely punished or recommended
punishment for offenders. 142 In fact, in most cases Korean truth
commissions have refrained from publicizing the names of perpetrators.
Nor have they been greatly involved in making recommendations for
institutional reforms. Rather, the focus has been on the victims, and
especially on revealing the truth surrounding their victimization and
rehabilitating their reputations, phrased as “restoring their honor” in the
preferred formulation.
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http://www.newscham.net/news/view.php?board=news&nid=59845 (asserting
that the termination of the TRC was for political reasons) (trans. Jeong-Min Lee).
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The first question is whether there has been complete truth telling
with regard to past crimes.143 Tragically, the answer to this question is a
resounding no. The first Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious
Deaths of 2001 was hampered by the lack of power to compel testimony
and production of information, and by the impediment of the statute of
limitations that prevented prosecution of potential suspects. South Korea
is a state party to the Rome Statute, which allows for the tolling of statutes
of limitations in cases of grave violations of human rights such as crimes
against humanity.144
The Democracy Act of 2000 made great strides towards
reconciliation insofar as it resulted in the rehabilitation of the reputations
of many of those involved in the democracy movement, as well providing
financial compensation to victims and their families. The Commission was,
however, dissolved with a number of uninvestigated and unresolved
petitions before it. The expectation was, however, that the TRC (with its
expansive investigative powers) would pick up where the Commission left
off and resolve these cases. Unfortunately, the great promise with which
the TRC began was never realized.
With regard to the issue of accountability for the wrongdoers, one
could argue that this was achieved to a degree, given that two former
presidents were prosecuted, convicted and jailed for their crimes against
the Korean people. While it is true that the trials of Chun, Roh and their
subordinates did provide South Koreans with a sense that some justice had
been done, their subsequent pardons after a mere two years justifiably
created a great deal of cynicism towards the concept of transitional
justice.145 Moreover, no other officials, or other individuals acting under
color of law, were brought to account for crimes committed during
authoritative rule.146
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The TRC was important in that it had much greater investigative
authority than the 2001 Commission. Further, because part of its mandate
was to bring about reconciliation between offenders and victims, the TRC
had a greater chance to achieve a national “healing” than South Korea’s
previous attempts. The TRC’s promise was, however, never realized.
Considering the recent election of President Park, it likely that they will
remain so. Reconciliation and societal harmony can never be realized
while these individuals remain free, safely ensconced in the bosom of the
statutes of limitations that protect them from prosecution for their crimes.
The solution to this is one that has been proposed a number of times to the
National Assembly, abolish the statute of limitations for crimes against the
Korean people and allow the perpetrators to be brought to justice.147 The
people of South Korea are strongly in favor of such legislation and the
KCC clearly opened the door when it found that suspending the statute of
limitations for certain crimes was constitutional under Korean law.148
Regarding crimes committed prior to and during the Korean War,
many of these cases have either been under investigated or not
investigated at all. This is very troubling given that a cable released by
Wikileaks dated October 20, 2009, indicates that there may be as many as
eight potential cases involving the deaths of Korean citizens at the hands
of US forces during the Korean War.149
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South Korea has consistently criticized Japan for its refusal to
acknowledge its past.150 President Park herself has stated that a lack of
trust exists between Seoul and Tokyo due to Japan’s failure to properly
address issues of “historical variety” such as the Korean women pressed
into sexual slavery during Japan’s occupation of Japan during World War
II. 151 South Korea’s stance is, however, weakened by the fact that the
nation itself has failed to properly address its own issues regarding the
past, including properly examining the issue of Korean collaboration with
colonial era Japan.152 Until it cleanses its own closet of skeletons, South
Korean accusations that Japan is failing to address its past, carry little
weight.
South Korean society is highly influenced by the Confucian
values of societal unity and harmony. There can be no harmony in a
society where untold numbers had their lives torn asunder without official
recognition, where there is no accountability for those who visited
egregious injustice upon the innocent and where unexcavated mass graves
dot the landscape.153 As director Chung Ji-Young poignantly stated upon
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the release of National Security: “If we triumph over the past, we can
move forward with unity and reconciliation.”154

Song Ho-Jin, “National Security” brings family and audience to tears in its
first showing, THE HANKYOREH (Oct. 8, 2012),
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